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ON CHRIS L. FIRESTONE AND NATHAN JACOBS’S 
IN DEFENSE OF KANT’S RELIGION: A COMMENT
George di Giovanni
In this comment on Firestone and Jacobs’s book, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, 
I take issue with (1) the authors’ strategy in demonstrating that it is possible 
to positively incorporate religion and theology into Kant’s critical corpus, 
and (2) their intention to focus on the coherence of Kant’s theory without 
necessarily recommending it for Christianity. Regarding (1), I argue that in 
pursuing their strategy the authors ignore the fact that Kant has transposed 
what appear to be traditional religious doctrines to a completely different 
level of reflection, in effect turning them into imaginary tropes intended to 
mask otherwise irreducible contradictions in his view of human agency. As 
for (2), I claim that the authors’ intention runs the risk of being disingenuous, 
since Kant presented his religion as the true religion, opposing it to historical 
Christianity (unless the latter, of course, is re-interpreted according to his 
own precepts).
I first wish to congratulate and thank Chris and Nathan for their book.1 
It is a welcome addition to Kant scholarship; we are all the richer for it. 
I would hope with my comments to stimulate further reflection on their 
work. I must say from the start, however, that I am pessimistic about the 
possibility of initiating a genuine dialogue. My understanding of Kant’s 
critique of reason, and the historical context in which I place that critique, 
are simply too far removed from theirs.2 However, one can at least try.
The authors’ clearly stated intention is to defend the thesis that “co-
gent arguments exist for thinking [that] Kant’s critical writings, taken as a 
whole, provide the grounds needed for positive incorporation of religion 
and theology into Kant’s philosophical program,”3 and to this end they 
parade a series of witnesses pro and contra the thesis, as if in a court of law 
in which the case of “people vs. Religion”4 is being decided. To go straight 
to the heart of the matter, my main worry about the book is that, if I were 
1Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008).
2I have detailed my position, both conceptually and historically, in Freedom and Reli-
gion in Kant and His Immediate Successors: The Vocation of Humankind, 1774–1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005; paperback edition, 2007), xvi–376.
3Firestone and Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, 2.
4Ibid., 1.
164 Faith and Philosophy
a member of the jury in the imagined trial, I would be unable at the end to 
render an informed verdict. If I were an advocate for either the prosecu-
tion or the defense, I would be planning an appeal from the beginning of 
the trial on the grounds that the bill of indictment had not been properly 
drawn up: no clear instructions could have been issued by the judge to the 
jury to inform their deliberations.
Videtur quod
i. The authors say: “The indictment against Religion . . . rests on showing 
that when its metaphysical motives and philosophical character are prop-
erly understood, the text becomes unstable and falls under the weight 
of internal and irreconcilable conundrums, while an adequate defense of 
Religion depends on showing that Kant’s metaphysical motivations and 
the philosophical character of Religion support an interpretation of the 
text that overcomes the so-called conundrums.”5
ii. They also say: “Defending the internal coherence of Religion from an 
expository vantage point and commending its desirability for Christianity 
are two entirely different matters, and we will, in this volume, focus ex-
clusively on the former.”6
Sed contra
Ad primum: As so drawn up, the indictment does not cover the possibility 
that I consider most plausible, which is that Religion indeed falls in line 
with Kant’s overall critical system, that it is even required by the latter in 
order that it attain closure precisely as a system, but that this is so because 
the premises on which the system is based are deeply flawed, and hence 
give rise to practical absurdities which Religion is then called upon to at-
tenuate, even mask, by means of suitably constructed “rational” myths. A 
juror aware of this possibility would be in the difficult situation of having 
to find in favor of the accused on the ground that Kant’s overall critical 
system, though obviously wrong from the juror’s point of view, would be 
nonetheless coherently wrong.
Ad secundum: The disclaimer cannot be maintained, at least not to the 
extent that by declining to recommend or not recommend Kant’s brand 
of religion to Christianity the defense can dispense with the need of 
measuring it, as religion, against Christianity. In fact Kant constantly mea-
sures his religion of duty against the practices of historical Christianity, 
declaring it to be superior to the latter—even to be the only legitimate 
form of religion. But the difference between the two is so great that one 
has reason to wonder whether, historically, Kant has the right to call his 
religion of duty a form of Christianity, or, for that matter, a form of reli-
gion at all. Let me be clear about this: I have no religious orthodox agenda 
to promote. I profess no religion, even though I confess that I would feel 
5Ibid., 12.
6Ibid., 6.
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much more at home among those who celebrate the dawn of Easter day 
with the “exultet iam angelica turba caelorum / exultent divina mysteria” than 
in a community of duty-constrained Kantians. If pressed, I would declare 
myself a Christian atheist. My only point is that religion is a historical 
phenomenon: its manifestations are meaningful only when considered in 
their proper Sitz im Leben. If Kant’s Religion, therefore, is more than just a 
conceptual game (as the authors surely do not believe it is); if its prescrip-
tions for a true religion are serious, then this would-be true religion must 
be considered in its Sitz im Leben, and that means by measuring it against 
the historical Christianity that it claims it can replace. I am saying, in 
other words, that in the trial in which we are called to participate, wit-
nesses as well as attorneys would be shadow-playing; worse, they would 
show disrespect for Kan if they thought that they could focus exclusively 
on the “internal coherence” of Religion. The issue at the heart of Kant’s 
book is an existential one.
Respondeo
There were ample precedents in scholastic theology for Kant’s theory 
of practical postulation, although the latter differed from these in a sig-
nificant respect. It was understood that, when God was at issue, any 
representation, any name attributed to him, could be at best a token 
signification that fell infinitely short of the intended object. It did not 
follow, however, that the representation, or any God-language, lacked 
meaning or convincing power, because the evidence that the represen-
tation lacked on its objective side was made up for subjectively. It was 
claimed that the “love of God,” or a human being’s natural and habitual 
attunement as individual to things divine, provided the source of both 
meaning and convincing power.7 The source was subjective, but not 
objectively irrelevant, for at the level of actual existence the individual 
was assumed to be constitutionally open to, even physically continu-
ous with, an external world that everywhere intimated the presence of 
transcendent mysteries. The two—individual human body and actual 
world—were by nature attuned to exalt in unison in the mysteria divina. 
Religion, in other words, was essentially a celebratory activity of which 
the embodied individual was the centre.
The parallels between this kind of belief, based on subjective inclina-
tions, and Kant’s postulation, based on the subjective interests of reason, 
are obvious. Equally obvious, however, is the difference. In the former, 
the subjectivity at issue is that of a historical individual, the kind who 
alone can be an effective source of agency and therefore also the source 
of such existentially indisputable facts as moral evil. In the latter case, 
the subjectivity is that of reason in general, that is to say, of an abstract 
“I” whose agency, precisely because it is abstract and must so remain on 
the assumption of Kant’s idea of “nature,” is restricted to mere intentions. 
7For an illustrative text, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, qu. 45, art. 2.
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Only the embodied individual is sufficiently positioned to be able to act. 
But neither Kant’s idea of reason nor that of nature can capture the reality 
of this individual—the one because it is purely formal; the other because, 
as actually experienced in contrast to being idealized, it is purely mechanis-
tic. Kant, perhaps unwittingly, admits this much when he acknowledges 
that neither can be the source of evil—evil being, of course, the ultimate 
test of true responsibility, hence guilt, hence agency. Reason is per se infal-
lible; nature, innocent.8 The need is therefore created to save the ordinary 
language of moral life by constructing such tropes as that of an individual 
who, affected by a radical evil that pervades the whole human species, is 
in need of God’s grace in order to act rightly. These tropes are rationally 
controlled but remain the work of the imagination and are ex hypothesi 
ultimately unintelligible. Much of Religion is based on precisely such 
tropes. The doctrine that it expounds might indeed fall within the bound-
aries of reason (that is, of typically Kantian reason), and might indeed 
be needed by Kant’s system in order to satisfy the interests of the reason 
behind it both in the theoretical domain, in order to complete the edifice 
of critical rationality, and in the practical one, in order to provide the lan-
guage for, if not the explanation of, historical action.9 The fact remains 
that the doctrine’s subject matter, namely, the individual as such, is not on 
Kantian premises intelligible per se but must depend for its determination 
on the work of idealizing imagination.
8Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Academy Edition: Kants 
gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Königliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1902–), 
6:34–35. Cf. also di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion, 81–82.
9Cf. Kant, Religion, 6:121n: “No human being can say with certainty why this human 
being becomes good, that one evil (both comparatively), for we often seem to find the pre-
disposition that makes for the distinction already at birth, and even contingencies of life 
over which nobody has any control are at times the decisive factor; and just as little can 
we say what will become of either. In this matter we must therefore entrust judgement 
to the All-seeing; and this is so expressed in the text as if he pronounces his decree upon 
them before they are born, thus prescribing to each the role that he will eventually play. 
For the world creator, if he is conceived in anthropopathic terms, prevision in the order of 
appearance is at the same time also predestination. But in the supersensible order of things 
in accordance with the laws of freedom, where time falls away, there is just one all-seeing 
knowledge, without the possibility of explaining why one human being behaves in this way, 
another according to opposite principles, and yet, at the same time, of reconciling the why 
with freedom of the will.” If “in the supersensible order of things in accordance with the 
laws of freedom, where time falls away, there is just one all-seeing knowledge, without the 
possibility of explaining why one human being behaves in this way, another according to 
opposite principles, and yet, at the same time, of reconciling the why with freedom of the 
will,” then it follows that all questions of guilt and responsibility, and with them moral-
ity itself, lose their meaning. It is not just that we cannot give metaphysical answers to 
questions about freedom because of our ignorance. It is rather that we are dealing here with 
an ultimately irrational matter. Cf. also Kant, Religion, 144n: “Hence in a practical context 
(whenever duty is at issue), we understand perfectly well what freedom is; for theoretical 
purposes, however, as regards the causality of freedom (and equally its nature) we can-
not even formulate without contradiction the wish to understand it.” Cf. also di Giovanni, 
Freedom and Religion, 151, 169; as well as footnote 52 of di Giovanni, “Faith without Religion, 
and Religion without Faith: Kant and Hegel on Religion,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
41:3 (2003), 365–383, 378.
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I trust that I am forgiven for remaining, as is only fitting in a “com-
ment,” at the level of mere statement.10 I have argued for this inability of 
Kantian theory to deal with the individual at length elsewhere. Of course, 
I am not the first to say that Kant’s Religion is required to resolve, but 
only subjectively, what otherwise would be an absurdum practicum. The 
early Wood said as much;11 so do the authors of the present book, and, if 
I remember correctly, so did David Strauss. According to Strauss, what 
made Kant’s treatment of religion different from that of the rationalist 
theologians of the German enlightenment was that, whereas the latter 
wanted to reduce Christian dogmas to rational truths, Kant kept the dog-
mas, but under the modality of rational myths for the sake of control-
ling the presence in experience of an irrational quantity. In this respect, 
although clearly a product of the Enlightenment, Kant already anticipated 
the nineteenth century. The point I am now making is that the absurdum 
in question, the irrational quantity, is not endemic to the human situa-
tion as such: theoretically, it is the product of Kant’s faulty metaphysical 
assumptions; practically, it only affects those who in their actions conceive 
themselves as caught up in a world such as Kant postulates. Kant has a 
serious problem in maintaining in his system the possibility of genuine 
agency. This is a problem that has long been recognized in the tradition of 
Kant interpretation. Hegel, for one, already argued that there is no clearly 
recognizable “I” in Kant’s system that could be capable of unequivocally 
initiating action—that the Kantian would-be human agent, therefore, is 
condemned to shifting back and forth between considering at one mo-
ment himself, and at the next God, as the author of a deed.12
In other words, the defense of Religion ignores the issue that most 
closely affects its doctrine—namely, whether the latter is more than just 
an essay in the language control of experiential data that are ultimately 
unexplainable. I find it ironic, therefore, to hear witnesses in the trial, 
for both the defense and the prosecution, rehearsing arguments remi-
niscent of those that were the staple of dogmatic theology, as if Kant had 
not pre-empted the possibility of ever finding a resolution for them. I 
seem to hear Molinists and Thomists, the Jesuits and the Dominicans, 
still engaged in their disputations regarding the role of divine interven-
tion in human actions. Kant’s critical philosophy is in fact being used in 
the same way as it was originally by the Jena theologians, and eventually 
by Reinhold who perfected their strategy, as if, once critical ignorance 
is admitted at the level of theory because of the subjective interests of 
10See note 2 above. But I have argued this point most extensively and incisively in my 
just-cited article, “Faith without Religion, and Religion without Faith,” in footnote 9.
11This is at least the implication of Wood’s interpretation of a “practical postulate” which 
he extends also to Religion. See Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1970).
12The locus classicus of Hegel’s criticism is to be found in section VI (subsection C.b: “Die 
Verstellung”) of the Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807). Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 9 (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1980), 332–340.
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reason, all past dogmatic metaphysics can be re-incorporated, as if from 
the backdoor, under the rubric of “moral faith.”13 This is the situation that 
Schelling decried to Hegel with reference to the Tübingen seminary in 
his famous letter of 1795: “Before you can turn around the deus ex machina 
springs forth, the personal individual Being who sits in Heaven above!”14 
I grant that Kant himself gave in more than one place enough of an open-
ing for this move by the theologians. But if one is truly to understand 
the spirit in which Kant was re-introducing into the critical system the 
tropes of a past theology, one must keep in mind a passage in the Critique 
of Judgment which is just as much ignored as this late work of Kant is 
quoted for allegedly serving to reconcile the theoretical and the practical 
side of his system: “If our understanding were intuitive, it would have no 
object except what is actual. . . . The proposition, therefore, that things 
can be possible without being actual, and thus that there can be no infer-
ence at all from mere possibility to actuality, quite rightly holds for the 
human understanding without that proving that this distinction lies in 
the things themselves.”15
If the modal categories do not apply to things as they are in themselves 
and would be grasped by an intuitive intelligence, if all that there is simply 
is, it follows that the whole realm of morality, for which the distinction be-
tween the “possible” and the “actual” is essential if the “ought” is to have 
any meaning, turns out to be, for Kant no less than for Spinoza, a mere 
epiphenomenon that can indeed be handled rhetorically, with the aid of 
suitable myths, but never intelligibly. Rationality turns into a formalism 
of the concept that must rely on extra-conceptual means in order to con-
nect with actual existence, the latter having been demoted by the formal-
ism to mere appearance. What the theologians in Jena or Tübingen did 
not realize is that, when re-introduced within the framework of Kant’s 
critical premises, their dogmas had lost, not just any ground of objective 
belief, but also the significance that they might previously have had as 
symbola fidei.
But my most serious objection against the defense in this trial, and the 
one on which I wish to conclude my brief, is that, if the defense were to 
succeed, it would follow that religion is an instrument of human action. 
Kant instrumentalized belief in God for the sake of resolving problems 
which were typically Kantian—more to the point, problems that can exist 
only for a humanity bound to the ideology of duty. If the defense were 
13I have especially in mind the dispute on the nature of free will that was raging at 
Jena between C. C. E. Schmid and Karl Leonhard Reinhold exactly at the time when Kant 
was turning his attention to the issue in the articles eventually leading to Religion. Kant was 
moving the discussion on a completely different level of reflection. On this, see my “Rehberg, 
Reinhold und C. C. E. Schmid über Kant und moralische Freiheit,” in Vernunftkritik und 
Aufklärung: Studien zur Philosophie Kants und seines Jahrhunderts, ed. Michael Oberhausen 
(Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001), 93–113.
14Schelling, “January 5, 1795,” in Hegel: The Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane 
Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 29.
15Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, 5:402; cf. 5:93, 99, 146–147.
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to succeed and this move of Kant were canonized, then the way would 
already lie open to Marx’s claim that religion is an opiate (the expression, 
incidentally, originates with Kant),16 a set of illusionary beliefs introduced 
for the sake of obviating the very real pains caused by a dysfunctional hu-
man existence. I prefer to believe that religion has nothing to do with duty 
but is rather a celebration of the human individual, of the things which, 
whether in joy or suffering, in evil or repentance, make the individual 
precisely the irreducible being that he or she is. And this is something that 
even an atheist can understand.
McGill University, Montreal 
16Cf. Kant, Religion, 6:78n.
